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課程名稱 |
產業組織實證方法
Empirical Methods in Industrial Organization |
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開課學期 |
104-2 |
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授課對象 |
社會科學院 經濟學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
黃景沂 |
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課號 |
ECON7049 |
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課程識別碼 |
323 M6320 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期三2,3,4(9:10~12:10) |
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上課地點 |
社科研604 |
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備註 |
限碩士班以上
總人數上限：25人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1042ECON7049 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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課程概述 |
The goal of this course is to familiarize students with empirical analysis in industrial organization. Specifically, we will talk about the development of New Empirical Industrial Organization in the past two decades.
See more details at:
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~chingihuang/teaching/IO2016/syllabus_IO_2016.pdf |
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課程目標 |
From the view of antitrust, we want to estimate market power. (For example, the regu
lator wants to know whether a proposed merger should be allowed.) Since products in most industries are horizontally differentiated, we will spend most of the time on consumer’s discrete choice of products in a differentiated market. We will introduce the BLP’s (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes) framework to empirically analyze this discrete choice problem. We then apply this framework to study various issues, such as price discrimination, competition of durable products, environmental policies.
In addition, we will briefly introduce the estimation methods for game-theoretic models. Game theory has been applied to study the interaction between actions in many fields of economics, including auctions, bargaining, oligopolies, social network formation, social choice theory, .... The equilibrium outcome of a game usually depends on model parameters. To determine these parameters from the real world data, we need econometric tools. Nonetheless, estimating a game-theoretical model often faces some methodological challenges, such as existence of multiple equilibria, the curse of dimensionality. Due to time constraint, this course
mainly covers static binary choice games. Most of the applications investigate entry/exit or open/closing decisions by firms in an oligopoly market.
There is no formal prerequisite. However, you should have learned some econometrics. You are expected to have known OLS, IV estimation, MLE, and GMM. You are also expected to have known basic solution concepts in game theory, such as Nash equilibrium, subgame
perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Basic knowledge of theoretical Industrial
Organization is helpful. |
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課程要求 |
Grades will be determined by classroom participation (20%), one classroom presentation (30%), a take-home midterm exam (25%), and a take-home final exam (25%). There will be NO make-up exam. Please make sure you can take the exams (due on April 20 and June 22, respectively) before enrolling this course. Send me your preferences over the papers with a # mark on the reading list. The presentation time is about 30–40 minutes. |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~chingihuang/teaching/IO2016/ |
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參考書目 |
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~chingihuang/teaching/IO2016/ |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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